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ABSTRACT 
 
Nuclear power has been included in Indonesian national plan as an alternative 
solution for electricity production.  However, Indonesia lies within the Pacific Ring of 
Fire with around 129 active volcanoes along its region. In addition, the Indonesian 
archipelago is formed by three major tectonic plates that continuously collide and move: 
the Eurasian Plate, the Pacific Plate, and the Indo-Oceanic-Australian Plate. 
Consequently, the entire Indonesian archipelago is relatively unstable due to high 
volcanic and seismic activities. In anticipation of the development of a nuclear power 
program and to ensure the safety of the current practices, the Indonesian government has 
the responsibility to provide an integrated conventional and nuclear/radiological 
emergency response plan. This plan is the basis to conduct response activities and the 
core of a national response framework.  
In this research, the current capability of the Indonesian government to respond a 
nuclear/radiological emergency is investigated. The result shows that appropriate 
response agencies as well as the legal framework governing emergencies have been 
formed. However, neither a conventional nor a nuclear/radiological emergency response 
plan has been established. To improve the current emergency system, the IAEA’s graded 
approach methodology for an integrated emergency planning is partially implemented. 
This graded methodology allows for a thorough evaluation, and ultimately strengthening 
Indonesian national response capabilities, correcting the defects in the current system, 
and building an integrated emergency response plan. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
EPR  Emergency Preparedness and Response 
LDMA Local Disaster Management Agency 
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency  
NBDM National Board for Disaster Management 
NCA  National Coordinating Authority 
NERA  National Energy Regulatory Agency 
NEPR  Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response 
NNEA  National Nuclear Energy Agency 
NR-EPR Nuclear/Radiological Emergency Preparedness and Response 
NRF  National Response Framework 
SSNI  Safety and Security of Nuclear Installations 
PAZ  Precautionary Action Zones 
UPZ  Urgent Protective Action Planning Zone 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background  
The Republic of Indonesia is an archipelagic country in the southeastern region of 
Asia and is comprised of approximately 17,508 islands, 6000 of which are inhabited 
(Figure 1). The country lies along the equator between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific 
Ocean and shares land borders with Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, and East Timor. 
Additionally, it shares maritime borders with Australia, Singapore, Thailand, 
Philippines, and Vietnam. Indonesian territory encompasses the land area of about       
1.9 million square kilometers (approximately three times the size of Texas). Based on 
census in 2013, its population reached 249 million people, making Indonesia the 4
th
 
largest populated country in the world.  
Despite the number of islands, the majority of Indonesians reside in Sumatera, 
Java, Borneo, Sulawesi, and Papua islands.  Java is the most populated island, where the 
country’s capital and most industrial centers are located. Consequently, as the population 
grows, the energy consumption also increases. Current energy needs are primarily met 
via fossil fuel, along with natural gas. However, domestic natural resources are limited. 
It is projected that the national production of fossil fuel will only be able to supply the 
domestic demand for approximately 23 - 62 years, while natural gas production is 
predicted to last for approximately 146 years (Republic of Indonesia, 2006a). This 
condition has forced the Indonesian government to find an alternative solution for 
energy production to reduce the dependence on current resources.  
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Figure 1. The map of Indonesian archipelago; Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Sulawesi, and Papua are the major 
islands (Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, 2014). 
 
In 2006, the president of the Republic of Indonesia established the Presidential 
Regulation on National Energy Policy (Republic of Indonesia, 2006b). The regulation is 
intended to secure domestic energy resources by reducing the use of fossil fuel and 
accelerating the development and the use of new and renewable energy by 2025. Among 
the considered alternative energy resources stated by the president are biomass, water, 
solar, wind, and nuclear. In 2007, the Energy Law was established to provide the legal 
basis for the implementation of the National Energy Policy. One important feature of 
this law is the establishment of the National Energy Council (NEC), which would be 
responsible for designing and drafting the policies, taking the necessary actions to 
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conserve national energy, and controlling the overall process of energy conservation 
(Republic of Indonesia, 2007a). 
The nuclear power program has been a long debated issue in Indonesia. The 
research and development on the application of nuclear energy was started in the 1960’s, 
and since then, the government’s nuclear research center has pursued the development of 
a nuclear power plant. However, no significant progress has been made.  As part of the 
nuclear power project, site evaluations were conducted, and the Muria Peninsula in 
Central Java was later chosen as the location for the power plant. Its location on Java 
Island is considered strategic due to the fact that the highest energy demand comes from 
this area. The site study was completed in 1996, but the project was discontinued for 
various reasons. One of the major reasons was the objection to nuclear power from the 
residents of Muria Peninsula and its vicinity. Regardless of the benefits of nuclear 
power, the residents were more concerned about the risks of an accident that could cause 
the release of radioactive material.  
The public’s concern about the safety of operating a nuclear power plant in 
Indonesia arose largely due to the country’s long history of natural disasters. Indonesia’s 
location on the Pacific Ring of Fire makes the volcanic activities relatively high; around 
129 out of 500 volcanoes in Indonesia are still active, and volcanic eruptions occur on a 
frequent basis (see Figure 2). In addition, Indonesian archipelago is formed by three 
major tectonic plates that continuously collide and move - the Eurasian Plate, the Pacific 
Plate, and the Indo-Oceanic-Australian Plate- making the entire Indonesian archipelago 
relatively unstable. Earthquakes happen frequently with various magnitudes, where the 
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number of recorded events can exceed 1000 earthquakes per year (Goltenboth and 
Erdelen, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 2. This picture shows the major volcanoes in Indonesia (Major volcanoes of Indonesia, 2014). 
  
Despite these setbacks and public concerns, the Indonesian government is still 
pursuing a nuclear power program. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
recommends that every country considering a nuclear power program develop and 
establish a nuclear/radiological emergency preparedness and response (NR-EPR) plan 
before any plant is built (IAEA, 2012). In this research, the Indonesian radiation 
emergency preparedness and response system will be investigated; the availability, 
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applicability, effectiveness, and weaknesses of the current Indonesian NR-EPR system 
will be explored. Subsequently, improvements will be prescribed by using the IAEA’s 
graded approach methodology. The IAEA’s standards and guidance and the United 
States National Response Framework (NRF) will be used as the main reference.  
This research is not intended to create a national NR-EPR plan for Indonesia, but 
rather possibly serve as the roadmap to create the EPR plan and as a basis for 
reformation. It is hoped that this research will provide valuable guidance in the 
development of an effective NR-EPR plan that will strengthen Indonesian national 
response capabilities. 
 
1.2. Literature Review 
The essence of an EPR plan is to support the safe operation of the nuclear power 
plant and thus protect people, society, and the environment from the potential hazards 
associated with its operation (IAEA, 2012). In the case of Indonesia, developing the EPR 
plan is vital not only from nuclear power safety considerations, but also the safety and 
security of current practices. Aside from research reactors, radioactive materials are 
widely used for research, medical, and industrial purposes. Also, the stakeholders are 
located throughout the archipelago, which raises the concern of illicit trafficking because 
of the daily transport of radioactive material.  
Emergency management generally consists of two phases: preparedness and 
response (IAEA, 2002).  An emergency preparedness program is intended to ensure the 
availability of methods, procedures, training, facilities and equipment, as well as inter-
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agency coordination framework prior to the emergency situation. Meanwhile, the 
emergency response is intended to provide adequate protection from radiation exposure 
to the public, property, and the environment following an emergency situation.  In 
addition, part of the response is to mitigate the consequences of the event.  
The main elements for an EPR based on the IAEA safety standards are presented 
below; requirements for preparedness and response phases apply for each element 
(IAEA, 2002). 
- Basic responsibilities 
- Assessment of threats 
- Establishing emergency management and operations 
- Identifying, notifying and activating 
- Taking mitigatory actions 
- Taking urgent protective actions 
- Providing information and issuing instructions and warnings to the public 
- Protecting emergency workers 
- Assessing the initial phase 
- Managing the medical response 
- Keeping the public informed 
- Taking agricultural countermeasures, countermeasures against ingestion and longer 
term protective actions 
- Mitigating the non-radiological consequences of the radiation emergency and the 
response 
- Conducting recovery operations 
- Requirements for infrastructure. 
To assist a country developing its NR-EPR system and seeking to comply with 
the safety standards, the IAEA introduced the integrated planning concept which covers 
all elements and variables of emergency events in one management framework. In this 
concept, all hazards are addressed in a general national emergency plan and specific  
NR-EPR plans are established based on the general plan. Figure 3 shows the integrated 
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planning concept; it illustrates the structure of the general emergency plans and the 
associate plans in the lower levels. 
 
Figure 3. The illustration of an integrated planning concept based on the IAEA-EPR Method 2003 (IAEA, 
2003). 
 
The integrated planning concept is developed using a graded approach 
methodology. The methodology consists of several tasks which need to be performed 
gradually to establish an effective response framework. For this research, 
implementation of the tasks is grouped into two phases. Phase 1 consist of tasks 1 – 5, 
and phase 2 covers task 6 – 10. Performing phase 1 will allow for identification of the 
weaknesses in emergency response capabilities and  enhancing the  interim capabilities. 
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To fully develop emergency response capabilities, all tasks from the two phases need to 
be completed. In this research, only the tasks in phase 1 will be implemented. The 
overall tasks, based on the IAEA EPR-Method 2003 (IAEA, 2003), are listed below. 
Task 1. review national policy 
Task 2. perform threat assessment  
Task 3. develop planning basis 
Task 4. develop concept of operations and allocate responsibilities 
Task 5. develop interim capabilities 
Task 6. write national radiation emergency plan 
Task 7. present national radiation emergency plan 
Task 8. implement detailed plans 
Task 9. test the capability 
Task 10. establish ongoing quality assurance and maintenance 
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2.  CURRENT STATUS ON NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY 
RESPONSE SYSTEM IN INDONESIA 
 
2.1. Emergency Management 
Radiation emergency management in Indonesia lies under the general disaster 
management framework. The framework is designed such that the main responsibility 
for disaster management attaches to the lowest possible government level to ensure the 
effectiveness of disaster management. Therefore, the disaster management agency is 
established in three levels of government: national, provincial, and municipal/district 
level. 
In the event of nuclear or radiological emergency, the Indonesian disaster 
management agency shall cooperate with the other participating organizations, which 
consist of government entities possessing the capability to enact an appropriate 
emergency response operation. The roles of the main agencies are discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
2.1.1. National Board for Disaster Management (NBDM) 
The NBDM is a non-ministerial government agency chaired by a minister-level 
official. It formulates policies in disaster management, and manages the evacuation of 
people in a proper and efficient manner. In addition, it is also responsible for conducting 
planned, integrated, and comprehensive coordination in the event of an emergency 
among all relevant disaster management stakeholders at the national level. Similar 
  
10 
 
responsibilities are carried out by the Local Disaster Management Agencies (LDMA), 
which work to ensure the disaster management at the provincial and municipal/district 
level, unless the scale of he disaster exceeds the capabilities of the local agencies and 
require the involvement of the NBDM.  
To carry out its disaster management duties, the NBDM cooperates with other 
relevant institutions. These institutions support various specific functions such as search 
and rescue, evacuation, mapping, providing hydro-meteorological data, research, and 
other related functions. In an emergency situation, the NBDM takes the lead role to 
direct the response operation. 
 
2.1.2. National Nuclear Energy Agency (NNEA) 
The NNEA is a non-ministerial government agency with the responsibility to 
conduct research and development on the application of nuclear energy in Indonesia. 
The research facilities include research reactors, irradiation facilities, and radioactive 
waste management centers. Additionally, it manages the laboratories’ radiation 
metrology, safety and health control, and environmental monitoring. Most NNEA 
facilities are centralized in the Science and Technology Research Center in the Serpong 
area which is located about 25 miles away from the Indonesian capital city of Jakarta.  
Other facilities are located in Bandung (West Java) and Jogjakarta (DI. Jogjakarta). 
NNEA’s resources are considered as the only assets that have the capacity to 
perform radiological assessment and monitoring. Thus, in terms of nuclear and 
radiological emergency management, the NNEA is appointed to be the radiological 
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assessor which is responsible to carry out radiation survey and monitoring, and dose 
assessment.  
 
2.1.3. Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (NERA) 
The NERA was established as an independent regulatory body in 1997. Prior to 
that time, the regulatory control function was carried out by the NNEA, which also 
served as the stakeholder in addition to being the regulator. Considering the potential 
conflict of interest, the responsibilities for promoting the utilization of nuclear energy 
and conducting regulatory functions were assigned to two different agencies.  
As mandated by the applicable law, NERA bears the responsibilities to ensure the 
safe practice of nuclear energy and control of the utilization of nuclear energy in 
Indonesia. It works to identify and assess the regulatory needs, establish the relevant 
regulations, issue the licenses, and conduct inspections of the facilities. In terms of a 
nuclear and radiological emergency system, NERA has the responsibility of evaluating 
the NR-EPR plans proposed by the stakeholders. In an emergency situation, NERA 
serves as a consultant to provide technical advice to the emergency responders, as well 
as supervising emergency response actions. Moreover, it takes the leading role to search, 
recover, and secure orphan sources as well as in incidents where there is a radioactive 
release and contamination from other countries.  
As the national coordinating authority (NCA) for nuclear and radiological 
emergency, NERA is responsible for receiving and disseminating information regarding 
any nuclear or radiological incident inside or outside of Indonesia. To support this 
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function, NERA established the National Warning Point (NWP), National Competent 
Authority Domestic (NCA-D), and the National Competent Authority Abroad (NCA-A) 
within in its organizational structure. 
 
2.1.4. National Army - Directorate of Nuclear, Biology, and Chemistry (DNBC) 
Even in cases where an emergency is due to the civilian practice of nuclear energy 
and radiation, the DNBC of the National Army will take part in the management of a 
nuclear and radiological emergency. If such a situation occurs and affects the area 
outside of the facility, the DNBC has the responsibility of carrying out contamination 
monitoring and decontamination of the people and the environment in the affected area. 
 
2.2. Regulatory Framework 
In general, the arrangements for disaster management in Indonesia are established 
in the form of regulations. Indonesian legislation adopts a hierarchy system where the 
general provisions are stipulated in higher level regulations and the detail provisions are 
stipulated in the lower level regulations. The system does not allow lower-level 
regulations to contain provisions which are not previously stipulated in higher-level 
regulations. The hierarchy system is shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. This figure shows the hierarchy of Indonesian legal system based on the Law Making Procedure 
No. 11 Year 2012. On the top level is the Constitution as the highest legal basis in Indonesia. From top to 
the bottom, the regulations become more specific and detail. 
 
The following regulations provide the essential legal basis for disaster 
management in Indonesia. Some of these specifically regulate nuclear and radiological 
related matters. The provisions are intended to govern a broad range of emergency 
management including nuclear and radiological emergencies.   
 
2.2.1. Disaster Management Law  
The Disaster Management (DM) Law serves as the basic legislation for overall 
emergency management in Indonesia. It specifies the definitions related with disaster 
management and stipulates the responsibilities of central and local governments in the 
The Constitution 
Laws 
People's Consultative Assembly Decree 
Government Regulation 
President Regulation 
Regional Regulation 
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event of a disaster. The law mandates the establishment of a disaster management 
agency at the national, provincial, and municipal/district levels in addition to assigning 
agency roles and responsibilities at every level.  
Additionally, the DM Law contains the provisions governing the following matters: 
the rights and obligations of citizens in the event of a disaster, the involvement of private 
and international organizations, disaster countermeasures, financial arrangement and aid 
management, government responsibilities in monitoring the implementation of disaster 
management, resolution of conflict, and criminal penalties. As commonly applied in the 
Indonesian legal system, the DM Law only regulates the general provisions. The details 
are specified separately in lower level regulations. 
 
2.2.2. Nuclear Energy Law 
The Nuclear Energy (NE) Law is the legal basis for the utilization of nuclear 
energy in Indonesia. Based on this law, nuclear energy is defined to cover both the 
energy released from atomic transformation in fissile material as well as the ionizing 
radiation from radioactive material. The law mandated the establishment of NNEA and 
NERA as the agencies responsible for promoting and regulating the utilization of nuclear 
energy in Indonesia. In addition, it contains provisions governing the safe use of nuclear 
energy, including the arrangement for transport of radioactive material and management 
of radioactive waste. This law does not specifically address a particular provision on 
emergency management but it rather stipulates the basic requirement for safety with an 
inherent obligation to further provide an arrangement for an emergency management.  
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2.2.3. Government Regulation on the Conduct of Disaster Management 
This regulation details the concept and operation of disaster management in the 
DM Law. Its provisions cover broad aspects of DM, from the technical requirements to 
financial arrangements. This regulation defines that the DM consists of three phases: 
pre-disaster, emergency response, and post-disaster.  The responsibilities of disaster 
management agencies in every level during these three phases are also specified. This 
responsibility includes the establishment of a DM plan in every level. Based on this 
regulation, the DM plan contains the program and budget for performing disaster 
management.  
 
2.2.4. Government Regulation on the Safety of Ionizing Radiation and the Security of 
Radioactive Material 
This regulation consists of detailed safety requirements for the utilization of 
radioactive material and the facilities, including the requirement for establishing a 
radiological emergency plan for pertinent facilities. The format and detailed 
requirements of the emergency plan are stipulated, however these requirements are 
imposed to the licensees. The regulation does not stipulate the arrangement for response 
to the escalation of emergency outside of the facility. 
 
2.2.5. Government Regulation on the Safety and Security of Nuclear Installations 
This regulation stipulates the general provisions for NR-EPR.  It requires that a 
NR-EPR plan should be established, not only at the facility level, but also at the 
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provincial and national levels, as an integral part of the national/provincial program for 
disaster management.  
 
2.2.6. Presidential Regulation on the Ratification of the Convention on Early 
Notification of a Nuclear Accident and Presidential Regulation on the Ratification 
of the Convention on the Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or 
Radiological Emergency 
Following the nuclear power plant accident in Chernobyl, the IAEA adopted the 
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident in 1986. The Convention is 
intended to provide a system for notification on a nuclear accident, which could involve 
a significant radioactive release to other countries. In this system, the country where the 
facility is located has to notify the IAEA and the affected countries regarding the time, 
location, radioactive release, and other significant data about the accident (IAEA, 
2014a).  To provide assistance and support to the country where a radiological 
emergency has occurred, the IAEA adopted the Convention on Assistance in the Case of 
a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency as the basis for an international 
framework for response (IAEA, 2014b).  
Indonesia became a party to both of the conventions on September 1986 and 
ratified them in 1996. The presidential regulations endorsed the provisions in the 
conventions into Indonesian national legal system, and it became the legal basis for 
imposing the convention’s specific requirements to the stakeholders in Indonesia. 
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2.2.7. NBDM Chairman Regulations 
NBDM Chairman Regulations stipulate detailed provisions on conventional 
emergency management to complement the DM Law and the pertinent government 
regulations. These regulations govern various aspects of emergency management such as 
the emergency command system, disaster risk assessment, establishment of the 
command center, management of disaster data and information. 
 
2.2.8. NERA Chairman Regulations 
Complimentary requirements on radiological and nuclear emergencies are 
established through the NERA chairman regulations. Based on the chairman regulations, 
the NERA establishes an emergency response force to supervise the on-site and off-site 
operations and to coordinate the response in particular cases. The response force is in 
charge of the emergency response operation in the case of the recovery of an orphan 
source, nuclear satellite re-entry, nuclear or radiological dispersal device explosion, 
radiological trans-boundary release, and the recovery of nuclear powered ship or sub-
marine (Republic of Indonesia, 2007b).  
In addition, the NERA chairman regulation requires the licensees to establish a 
NR-EPR plan for their facilities (Republic of Indonesia, 2010). The regulation also 
contains the provisions on the preparedness program and requirement for response 
operations, threat categorization, the establishment of the emergency zones, and 
guidance dose levels for the emergency worker. 
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2.3. Radiation Emergency Management 
Based on the applicable regulations, all nuclear and radiation facilities are required 
to provide the necessary resources to support the management of a radiation incident on 
their site. This includes the establishment of an emergency response organization, plans 
and procedures, specialized equipment, required team member skills, and scheduled 
training and drills for emergency personnel. The regulations also require that the 
facilities report to the NERA when there are increases in the range, scope, and 
complexity of the emergency situation and if an off-site response is needed. 
Further, the Government Regulation on the Safety and Security of Nuclear 
Installations (SSNI) mandated the LDMA or NBDM to manage the local or national 
emergency response operation. Once a local or national radiation emergency is declared, 
the SSNI requires that the emergency response operation is carried out based on the local 
or national NR-EPR plan. The declaration of local or national emergency is conducted 
based on the following criteria (Republic of Indonesia, 2012): 
a. Local emergency 
1. A dose rate of 5 µSv hr-1 or more measured for at least 10 minutes at the boundary 
of the facility; or 
2. Airborne activity concentration equivalent to the dose rate of 5µSv hr-1 at the 
boundary of the facility. 
b. National emergency 
1. A dose rate of 500 µSv hr-1 or more measured for at least 10 minutes at the 
boundary of the facility; or 
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2. Airborne activity concentration equivalent to the dose rate of 500 µSv hr-1 at the 
boundary of the facility. 
 
2.4. Current National Capacity in Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Response  
A national nuclear and radiological crisis center has been established at NERA 
headquarter in Jakarta. In the event of national nuclear or radiological emergency, the 
national crisis center can only be activated by the president. All operations of national 
emergency management will be coordinated and directed from this center by the head of 
NBDM with assistance from the representatives of every element in the ICS. The crisis 
center is equipped with a meeting room, communications room, and radiological data 
monitoring system. Its current operation is managed by the NERA, which also uses the 
center to perform emergency training and table top exercises. 
In addition to the crisis center, NERA has its own resources to perform emergency 
response operations. These resources include emergency responders, facilities, and 
equipment. The emergency responders are nuclear and radiological safety inspectors, 
which have been trained in nuclear/radiological response. A ground-based vehicle for 
search and recovery is also available, as well as detection and decontamination 
equipment. 
NNEA also has several assets to support an emergency response.  These include 
technical personnel for laboratory dose assessment, environmental sampling, analysis 
and laboratory facilities.  The main laboratory currently is employed for cytogenetics-
based biodosimetry, in vivo and in vitro bioassay, and internal dose assessment. 
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Moreover, NNEA is capable of providing simple atmospheric dispersion modelling and 
dose predictions. The meteorological data for this purpose is supplied by the National 
Agency for Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysics. 
 
  
  
21 
 
3. ISSUES AND CHALLENGES  
 
Most of the IAEA recommendations for developing an effective EPR system have 
been established in Indonesian. At present, Indonesia has appointed the national 
coordinating authority (NCA) to promote the integration of NR-EPR into the 
conventional EPR system. The IAEA encourages the establishment of an NCA prior to 
integration of the country’s response capabilities, because its role is very important for 
the integration process (IAEA, 2003). Additionally, most of the IAEA’s 
recommendations for the NR-EPR management have been adopted in the Indonesian 
legal system. Current regulations enforce the IAEA’s basic requirements regarding the 
allocation of NR-EPR responsibilities and classification of radiation hazards. The 
IAEA’s functional requirements regarding the necessary response actions, even though it 
has not been fully adopted, have also been stipulated in the regulations.  
With all the supporting infrastructures in place, Indonesia should have been able to 
establish a comprehensive and integrated EPR system. In fact, the progress of 
implementing the system is slow. The first indicator is the absence of the national NR-
EPR plan. The NBDM is mandated by the law to establish a national NR-EPR plan as an 
integral part of the national emergency plan. After several years, there is no progress in 
creating the plan. The current Indonesian national emergency plan, which is commonly 
known as Disaster Management (DM) plan, still focuses on the natural hazards and 
prioritizes the emergency response program in these areas. Another indicator is the 
establishment of the national emergency response organization. This organization 
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includes several government agencies having functions in emergency management. The 
formation of this organization is intended to perform and support the emergency 
response actions at the national level. Having this emergency response organization 
would be strategic considering the current application of nuclear energy in Indonesia and 
the future plan for the NPP. However, it has not been legally established even though its 
formation was initiated in 2007. 
A conclusion about the current Indonesian EPR system can be drawn from these 
two indicators. First, there is an internal issue related with the inter-agency coordination. 
Developing a national NR-EPR plan and establishing a multi-agency organization 
requires strong cooperation and coordination. Even though it has the responsibility to 
establish the national NR-EPR plan, the NDBM cannot assign any agencies to be 
involved without consulting the pertinent agencies. The same rule applies for the 
formation of the national response organization. Every agency must acknowledge and 
support their involvement in the overall emergency management plan.  
At this point, the function of the NCA is crucial. It takes the active role in the 
coordination process; it supervises and ensures that the responsibilities of all  agencies 
engaged in the NR-EPR system are assigned properly. The NCA helps the NBDM in the 
coordination process and accomplishing the mandate for the NR-EPR plan, as well 
establishing the response organization. However, the NCA’s performance is not yet 
optimal. The NERA, as the NCA, has not been able to coordinate properly with the 
NBDM and the other agencies. When coordination is not effective, it is inevitable that 
the development of integrated EPR system would be affected. 
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To resolve the coordination issue, establishing a legally binding agreement 
between the NBDM and NERA as the main agencies will be beneficial. This agreement 
will be the platform of coordination between the two agencies. To be effective, the 
agreement should contain detailed descriptions of the agencies’ responsibilities in 
developing the integrated EPR system. Once the agreement is formed, both agencies 
should start to identify the other national organizations which will have roles in radiation 
emergency response and subsequently involve those agencies so that their 
responsibilities in emergency response can be defined.   
The consolidation between the NBDM and the NERA will undoubtedly foster the 
integration of the conventional and NR-EPR systems. However, there are challenges in 
the development of the system. First, the NBDM main program is currently focused on 
natural disasters which frequently occur in Indonesia. Additional duties in regards to 
radiation emergencies will require more resources which might not readily be available. 
For example, the NBDM will need qualified human resources having knowledge in 
radiation emergency response in its organizational structure. It will also need financial 
resources to support the necessary infrastructure for the NR-EPR. Second, Indonesia 
does not have a general emergency management framework. The DM plan as the 
national reference for of all emergency management plans is not a response framework, 
but rather contains the government program for conducting disaster risk reduction 
activities, emergency response and recovery. Consequently, the NR-EPR plan must be 
explicit in describing the arrangements for radiation emergency response. 
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There are strategies to address the aforementioned challenges. For the first step, 
the NBDM has to include the program for developing the national NR-EPR in the DM 
plan. All radiation hazards associated with the application of nuclear energy have to be 
identified and incorporated into the DM plan. The NERA should provide the necessary 
data and information for this purpose. The hazard descriptions do not have to be 
detailed, but sufficient enough for the NDBM to propose the program. In the program, 
the NDBM should address the need for human resources and the necessary infrastructure 
and budgeting. Since the current DM Plan was established in 2010, it will be updated in 
2014 because it is effective for a period of five years. During this time, the NBDM and 
the NERA can prepare for the NR-EPR plan with the assumption that a legal agreement 
has been made to facilitate the coordination between the two agencies. 
Considering the detail required for the NR-EPR plan, it must be planned and 
drafted carefully. Therefore, the implementation of the IAEA’s graded approach 
methodology for creating a NR-EPR plan will be useful. This metholodogy is designed 
to be modular, dynamic, and can only be performed with full involvement and 
cooperation of all relevant response agencies (IAEA, 2003). Section 4 of this thesis will 
discuss in more detail the implementation of the graded approach methodology, with the 
emphasis on the first five tasks of the methodology.   
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4. INTEGRATED EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE SYSTEM 
 
In this section, phase 1 which consists of the first five tasks of the graded approach 
methodology will be discussed. These tasks review the existing national NR-EPR 
capabilities, identify the elements which need to be improved, and collect other pertinent 
information which are important for drafting the plan. The outcome of this process will 
be the main elements which are necessary in developing a national NR-EPR plan.  
 
4.1. Task 1: Review National Policy 
Reviewing the national policy is an essential step in the integration of the EPR 
system. The purpose of this task is to ensure the availability of a legal framework for 
establishing a national NR-EPR plan and to identify the needs for revising the existing 
laws (IAEA, 2003). During this process, the provisions for emergency management on 
both conventional and NR-EPR regulations have to be taken into account. This is aimed 
to ensure compliance with the regulations and avoid any legal conflicts in the EPR plan. 
 The applicable emergency regulatory framework in Indonesia is described in 
section 2 of this thesis. Based on that description, it can be concluded that the necessary 
legal framework for both conventional and radiation emergencies is available. However, 
many provisions in NR-EPR regulations need to be re-evaluated. Some of the 
provisions, especially in NERA’s chairman regulation on Nuclear Emergency 
Preparedness and Response (NEPR), are no longer valid. The validity of the NEPR is 
strongly related with the general provisions on NR-EPR, which are governed in the 
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government’s regulation on the Safety and Security of Nuclear Installations (SSNI). The 
SSNI was established two years after the enforcement of the NEPR. 
In addition to the validity of its provisions, there are more reasons which 
necessitate revision of the NEPR. Most of the provisions in the NEPR are still at 
conceptual levels, making its enforceability necessarily low. The allocation of 
responsibilities for emergency response specified in the NEPR is also not clear. For 
instance, one part of the document states that the on-site emergency responders are 
responsible to take all response actions during a general emergency situation. A general 
emergency situation is declared by facilities in threat categories I and II (see Table 3 
about threat categorization) when the emergency affects the area outside of the facility 
boundaries. In this situation, the regulation requires the facility operator to conduct 
radiological assessment in the precautionary action zone (PAZ), urgent protective action 
planning zone (UPZ), and the food restriction planning radius. This arrangement 
becomes unreasonable because these areas vary greatly and can range from 3 to 300 km 
(Republic of Indonesia, 2010). It is unlikely that only facility responders can perform 
these duties unless there is coordination with the government and the off-site responders. 
Although the regulation requires coordination between the facility with the off-site 
responders, it does not specify the scope of duties of the off-site responders. 
Without a proper allocation of responsibilities, the emergency response could be 
ineffective due to confusion and the confict of information between the emergency 
responders (IAEA, 2003). Hence, it is important to specify the  responsibilities of the 
facility and off-site responders in the emergency situation. The regulation has to define 
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when the emergency situation requires the involvement of the off-site responder. The 
delegation and transfer of responsibilities between the facility, local and national 
responders must also be specified, as well as the process on how the delegation and 
transfer of responsibilities is performed. 
The current provisions in the NEPR and SSNI regarding the declaration on 
emergency situations also bear potential conflict. Both regulations require the 
declaration of emergency situation based on different classifications. The SSNI classifies 
the emergency situation into 3 classes: facility, local, and national emergency. This 
classification differs from emergency class in the NEPR, which consist of alert, site area 
emergency and general emergencies. Compatibility of the emergency classes is very 
important because the subsequent response actions will be based on these classifications. 
For this reason, the differences between the emergency classifications must be resolved.  
The compatible emergency classes can be incoorporated in the revision of the 
NEPR. Prior to establishing the proper classification terminology, there are some 
considerations which need to be taken into account. First, the emergency classification 
should be harmonized with the IAEA’s classification because emergency situations 
could also involve an international response. It is important to have the common 
classification to avoid misinterpretation of the emergency situation and to facilitate the 
response operations. Table 1 presents the current Indonesian radiation emergency 
classification and the proposed classification based on the IAEA recommendation. 
Second, revision to the emergency classification in the SSNI need to be avoided 
considering that changing a provision in a government regulation would require 
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extensive efforts. It is inefficient to revise the SSNI while the provisions can be 
corrected without compromising the legality of the regulation. This can be done by 
attaching the proper classification into the existing group in the SSNI. Hence, the 
revision of NEPR will specify the emergency classification as follow: 
1. Facility emergency 
A facility emergency could result from site area emergency, facility emergency, 
alert, and other emergencies. The declaration of facility emergency has to be 
specified based on these specific classes. 
2. Local emergency 
A local emergency could result from general emergency and other emergencies. It is 
declared as local emergency when the limit specified in the SSNI is exceeded.  
3. National emergency 
A national emergency could result from general emergency and other emergencies. It 
is declared as national emergency when the limit specified in the SSNI is exceeded. 
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Table 1. This table presents the current Indonesian radiation emergency classification and the proposed classification based on 
the IAEA recommendation. 
Current Classification in Indonesia                         
(Republic of Indonesia, 2010) 
Proposed Classification based on IAEA guidance     
(IAEA, 2003) 
General emergency 
Declared by the facilities in threat category I and II, when the 
emergency affaects the area outside of the facilities.  
General emergency 
This emergency class applies to facilities in threat category I 
and II as the result of a loss of shielding, or a criticality in the 
reactor that would cause the release of radioactive material or 
radiation exposure. Hence, the facility’s operator, local and/or 
national officials must have arrangements available that 
anticipate the possibility of the escalation of the emergency 
beyond the facility’s border.  
When a general emergency occurs, protection of the people, 
environment, and property outside the facility and in the EPZs 
becomes the main objective of the national response. 
Site area emergency  
Declared by the facilities in threat category I and II, when the 
emergency affects the area inside of the facilities.  
Site area emergency  
Site area emergency should be identified at facilities in threat 
category I or II when there is significant decrease of radiation 
protection on-site and near the facility. Off-site response is not 
necessarily warranted; however, arrangements must be 
available at the facility, local and/or national level for 
protective actions on and off the site. 
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Table 1.  Continued 
Current Classification in Indonesia                         
(Republic of Indonesia, 2010) 
Proposed Classification based on IAEA guidance     
(IAEA, 2003) 
- Facility emergency 
Facility emergency occurs at the facilities in threat category I, 
II, or III due to significant decrease of radiation protection on 
the site. In this case, off-site response is not required 
Alert 
Declared by the facilities in threat category I, II, and III, when 
the emergency occurs in a building inside of the facilities. 
Alert 
The facility’s operator in threat category I, II, or III must 
release an alert when there is significant or uncertain decrease 
of radiation protection on the site. On-site or off-site response 
organizations might not be activated unless the mitigatory 
actions fail to terminate the emergency situation. 
- Other emergencies 
Other emergencies such as loss, theft, or lack of control of 
radioactive material due to malicious acts, illicit trafficking, 
and similar causes 
 
  
31 
 
Although the IAEA suggests that the regulatory infrastructure does not have to be 
complete prior to starting the development of the NR-EPR plan, the necessary 
requirements for performing emergency response operations need to be identified and 
complemented during the planning process (IAEA, 2003). The following paragraphs 
discuss the requirements for national response which have not been incoorporated in the 
current Indonesian NR-EPR regulations. The importance of enforcing the requirements 
and the strategies to develop the regulations are also addressed. 
 
4.1.1. Requirements for radiation emergency facilities to be established prior to and 
during the emergency situation.  
The IAEA recommends the establishment of emergency facilities and locations 
for conducting emergency operations prior to or during the emergency situation. The 
facilities include, but are not limited to: the designated and referral hospitals, assistance 
centers, emergency operation facility, and radiological monitoring and assessment center 
(IAEA, 2003). The requirements for establishing these facilities, the responsible 
agencies and the process of a facility’s activation have to be specified in the regulation. 
While preparing the regulation governing the radiation emergency facilities, the NERA 
must identify the facilities that will be established in advance, such as the designated and 
referral hospitals. These hospitals must have personnel who have adequate knowledge 
and skill as well as equipment for the treatment of radiation exposure and contamination 
(IAEA, 2003). Identifying locations such as these in advance is useful to determine the 
future need for equipment and personnel training. 
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4.1.2. Requirement for the urgent protective actions which have to be taken by the off-
site responders during the general emergency and site area emergency for the 
facilities in threat category I and II.  
Selecting the appropriate protective actions, in the case of a radiological 
emergency, is heavily affected by the potential of deterministic effects, the possibility of 
stochastic effects, and the adverse effects of radiation exposures to the environment, to 
property, and the economy (IAEA, 2011). Establishing these protective actions in a 
timely manner is required to protect the affected population. In the planning process, a 
system of protective actions, which consist of a series of dose criteria and the 
corresponding response actions, has to be developed to assist decision makers in taking 
the necessary urgent protective actions. 
There are documents that can be useful in developing these protective actions. In 
the Unites States protective action guides (PAGs) were developed by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA).  These are based on the projected dose to a reference man 
through various exposure pathways during the early, intermediate, and late phases of an 
incident.  These are used by the authorities at various levels to develop the relevant 
emergency plans (EPA, 1992). A more recent document for developing the protective 
actions criteria is established by the IAEA. The concept of protective actions is similar to 
the EPA PAGs, in that the IAEA recommends the implementation of protective actions 
based on predefined criteria. These criteria are divided into two categories (IAEA, 
2003): 
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a. Generic criteria 
The generic criteria for protective actions are generated based on dose that has been 
projected prior to an incident and dose that has been received due to the incident. 
However, these criteria are not measurable values. For example, iodine thyroid 
blocking should be taken when it is projected that the first 7 days of an incident 
would cause an equivalent dose of 50 mSv to the thyroid. This criterion is not 
practical for the actual measurement, thus default operational criteria have to be 
developed.  
b. Operational criteria 
The operational criteria consist of emergency action levels (EALs), operational 
intervention levels (OILs), and observable indicators on the scene. The EALs 
correspond to emergency classification and are determined based on the observable 
threshold instrument readings in the facility. The OILs are measurable values 
generated from the generic criteria and are expressed in dose rate, activity, or 
activity concentration. Measured OILs apply to radioactive material released, time 
integrated air concentrations, ground or surface contamination, environmental or 
food contamination. Figure 5 illustrates the relationship between generic and 
operational criteria. 
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Figure 5. This figure illustrates the relationship between the generic and the operational criteria (IAEA, 
EPR 2003). 
 
Developing the PAGs would be the responsibility of the NERA, as the national 
regulatory authority in Indonesia. The IAEA’s generic intervention criteria will initially 
need to be adopted, followed by developing the default OILs. The EPA PAGs and 
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) guidance would be 
valuable references for developing the OILs as they provide methods for deriving the 
operational limits.    
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4.1.3. The central government’s roles in providing and issuing warnings to the public in 
regard with national emergency.  
The central government’s roles in providing and issuing warnings to the public, in 
the case of radiation emergency have to be defined in the regulation. The process of 
information and warning dissemination must be defined though regulation for an 
effective emergency response. This system has been applied in the United States. The 
NRF defines the emergency management authority responsible to provide prompt and 
reliable information to decision makers and the public regarding any emergency 
situation and the necessary actions being taken (NRF, 2013). The provisions in the 
current NEPR which require the facility to issue the information and warning to the 
public has to be corrected. The role for releasing such information has to be given to the 
national authority; the facility will support by updating the proper information provided 
to the authority. 
 
4.1.4. Requirements for protecting the emergency workers.  
The IAEA defines the emergency workers as the people who have the risk of 
being exposed to radiation during their work in mitigating the consequences of a 
radiation emergency (IAEA, 2007). The emergency workers include the fire fighters, 
law enforcement, medical personnel, drivers and evacuation crews, radiation specialists, 
radiation protection officers, and radiological assessors (IAEA, 2002). Since their 
working environment may pose a high radiation risk, there must be sufficient regulatory 
  
36 
 
arrangements for keeping these workers protected. The regulation must include, at a 
minimum: 
a. the provisions for performing radiological monitoring and long term 
radiological assessment; 
b. provisions to provide procedures for maintaining the dose limits and 
contamination levels; 
c. assigning responsibility to provide protective equipment and training for the 
emergency workers; and 
d. the corresponding OILs for emergency workers. 
 
4.1.5. The criteria for taking agricultural countermeasures, countermeasures against 
ingestion, and longer-term protective actions. 
The current regulation does not specify the criteria for taking agricultural 
countermeasures, countermeasures against ingestion, and longer-term protective actions. 
These criteria are important to facilitate the necessary actions for protecting segments of  
the population who may consume contaminated food products (IAEA, 2007). Besides 
the protective actions criteria, there must be criteria for restricting access to the 
contaminated area and to relocate the people living around the affected zones. These 
criteria can be established based on the default OILs for controlling the agricultural 
products and relocation. The requirement can be satisfied by imposing the responsibility 
on the relevant government agencies for restricting the consumption and the 
distribution\sale of contaminated agricultural products. 
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4.1.6. Safety and security areas 
The concept of inner cordoned area radius or the safe distances has not been 
regulated in Indonesia. The safe distances are mostly applied to the emergency situations 
due to a transport accident involving radioactive materials, radiological dispersal 
devices, or explosion/fire involving nuclear weapons. The implementation of the safe 
distances during these situations is aimed to reduce the potential risk of radiation 
exposure to the public and the first responders. To ensure its applicability, it is important 
to enforce these default values into the regulation. It is also beneficial to include the 
safety perimeters in the national NR-EPR plan to facilitate the development of relevant 
EPR plans and procedures by relevant response agencies. The inner cordoned area radius 
or the safe distances, based on the IAEA EPR-Methods is presented in Table 2. Once 
this task is done, Task 2 of this method will be completed.  
Table 2.  The suggested safe distances which have to be implemented for specific 
emergency situations (IAEA, 2003). 
Situation Safe Distances 
Intact package with a I-WHITE, II-
YELLOW or III-YELLOW label 
Immediate area around the package 
Damaged package with a I-WHITE, II-
YELLOW or III-YELLOW label 
30 m radius or at: 
- Ambient dose readings of 100 μSv h-1 
- 1000 Bq cm
2
 gamma/beta deposition 
- 100 Bq cm
2 
alpha deposition 
Undamaged common source (consumer 
item) such as smoke detector 
None  
Other unshielded or unknown source 
(damaged or undamaged) 
30 m radius or at 
- Ambient dose readings of 100 μSv h-1 
- 1000 Bq cm
2
 gamma/beta deposition 
- 100 Bq cm
2 
alpha deposition 
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Table 2. Continued 
 
 
 
Situation Safe Distances 
Spill Spill area plus 30 m around 
Major spill Spill area plus 300 m around 
Fire, suspected radiological dispersal 
devices, explosion or fumes, spent fuel, 
plutonium spill 
300 m radius (or more to protect against 
effects 
of an explosion) or at 
- Ambient dose readings of 100 μSv h-1 
- 1000 Bq cm
2
 gamma/beta deposition 
- 100 Bq cm
2
 alpha deposition 
Explosion/fire involving nuclear 
weapons (no nuclear yield) 
1000 m radius or at: 
- Ambient dose readings of 100 μSv h-1 
- 1000 Bq cm
2
 gamma/beta deposition 
- 100 Bq cm
2
 alpha deposition 
  
4.2. Task 2: Perform threat assessment  
The second task in the graded approach methodology  is performing a threat 
assessment. For the purpose of the national NR-EPR plan, this task is intended to 
identify the practices and facilities in the whole country, which pose radiation and non-
radiation hazards due to its operations. Identifying these hazards will allow for designing 
the appropriate actions to be taken during a response. The IAEA categorizes these 
hazards or threats into 5 groups to facilitate the planning for emergency response. This 
categorization has been adopted in NEPR, hence it should be used as the reference for 
performing the threat assessment. The description of the threat category is provided in 
Table 3.   
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Table 3. List of threat categories for facilities and activities based on the IAEA 
categorization (IAEA, 2002). 
Threat 
category 
Description 
I 
 
Facilities, such as nuclear power plants, for which on-site events 
(including very low probability events) are postulated that could give 
rise to severe deterministic health effects off the site, or for which such 
events have occurred in similar facilities 
II 
Facilities, such as some types of research reactors, for which on-site 
events are postulated that could give rise to doses to people off the site 
that warrant urgent protective action in accordance with international 
standards, or for which such events have occurred in similar facilities. 
Threat category II (as opposed to threat category I) does not include 
facilities for which on-site events (including very low probability 
events) are postulated that could give rise to severe deterministic 
health effects off the site, or for which such events have occurred in 
similar facilities 
III 
Facilities, such as industrial irradiation facilities, for which on-site 
events are postulated that could give rise to doses that warrant or 
contamination that warrants urgent protective action on the site, or for 
which such events have occurred in similar facilities. Threat category 
III (as opposed to threat category II) does not include facilities for 
which events are postulated that could warrant urgent protective action 
off the site, or for which such events have occurred in similar facilities 
IV 
Activities that could give rise to a nuclear or radiological emergency 
that could warrant urgent protective action in an unforeseeable 
location. These include non-authorized activities such as activities 
relating to dangerous sources obtained illicitly. They also include 
transport and authorized activities involving dangerous mobile sources 
such as industrial radiography sources, nuclear powered satellites or 
radio-thermal generators. Threat category IV represents the minimum 
level of threat, which is assumed to apply for all States and 
jurisdictions. 
V 
Activities not normally involving sources of ionizing radiation, but 
which yield products with a significant likelihood of becoming 
contaminated as a result of events at facilities in threat category I or II, 
including such facilities in other States, to levels necessitating prompt 
restrictions on products in accordance with international standards. 
 
A simple threat assessment was conducted to identify the existing practices and 
facilities in Indonesia, which fall into each category in Table 3. The results of this 
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assessment are presented in Table 4. Locations of some facilities and activities cannot be 
defined in the table because they are not in fixed locations, such as the transport of 
radioactive material. Therefore, a more comprehensive threat assessment should be 
undertaken by the government  to provide a better vulnerability analysis of Indonesian 
activities The following should be included in the analysis: the origins, destinations, 
transits and routes for  radioactive material, and the probability of locations where 
radioactive sources are illicitly transported, abandoned, or stolen (IAEA, 2007). 
The threat assessment also has to include the description of the EPZ for the 
facilities in threat categories I and II. Determination of the EPZ is important because the 
implementation of the off-site urgent protective actions (i.e., sheltering and evacuation) 
will be based on the EPZ (IAEA, 2007). Indonesia currently does not have a NPP, which 
falls into threat category I, therefore the threat assessment for the EPZ will only apply 
for the facilities in threat category II. The description of the EPZ in the form of a map, 
should be presented in the NR-EPR plan. 
After completion of the threat assessment in Task 2, developing the planning basis 
for the EPR plan in Task 3 can be initiated.  
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Table 4. List of the current threat category based on Indonesian EPR regulation. 
Threat 
 Category 
Facility or Activity 
Number of Facilities 
or Activities 
Location 
(Province) 
I Nuclear power plants None None 
II 
Research reactors 2 
Banten, D.I. 
Jogjakarta 
Radioactive waste 
management center 
1 Banten 
III 
Research reactor 1 West Java 
Nuclear Fuel Element 
Fabrication 
2 Banten 
Radioisotope 
production 
1 Banten 
Irradiator category IV 2 
DKI Jakarta, West 
Java (Bekasi) 
Radiotherapy facility 13 
South Sumatera, 
West Sumatera, 
DKI Jakarta, East 
Java, West Java, 
Central Java, DI 
Jogjakarta, South 
Kalimantan, Bali 
Industrial radiography 
– closed (secured) 
facility 
None None 
IV 
Industrial radiography 
– open facility 
520 Most Provinces 
Well logging 1539 Most Provinces 
Gauging – high activity 1512 Most Provinces 
Transport of 
radioactive material 
Unidentified Unidentified 
V 
Trans-boundary 
release, import of 
contaminated products 
Unidentified Unidentified 
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4.3. Task 3: Develop planning basis 
The planning basis is developed based on the threat assessment. After collecting 
the necessary information about the existing threat categories, the possible emergencies 
which could happen in each threat category and the response plan for the emergency 
situations should be addressed in the NR-EPR plan. To develop the national planning 
basis, some information first needs to be collected.  For example, the information about 
availability of medical, police, and fire fighting teams, sheltering, and transportation for 
evacuation purposes. Collecting this information requires the involvement of the relevant 
agencies having duties in these areas. The necessary information for the planning basis 
as well as possible agencies in Indonesia to provide such information, are presented in 
Table 5. The list of the information in the table is adapted from the IAEA EPR-Methods 
(IAEA, 2003). 
The next tasks in the graded methodology are developing a concept of operations 
and allocating the responsibilities for response operations. These tasks actually can be 
performed in parallel with developing the planning basis. Considering that the tasks will 
involve the same agencies, it is actually beneficial to simultaneously perform these two 
tasks. However, for discussion purposes, Task 4 is elaborated separately.  
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Table 5. List of information which is required to develop the planning basis for the NR-
EPR plan. 
No Threat 
Category 
Information Responsible Agencies 
1.  1,2,3 Medical, police and fire fighting 
support available 
Ministry of Health, National 
Police Department, Ministry of 
Internal Affair 
2.  1,2 Typical sheltering available in the 
UPZ 
NBDM, Ministry of Internal 
Affair 
3.  1,2 Typical transportation available for 
evacuation within the UPZ 
NBDM, Ministry of 
Transportation 
4.  1,2,3,4,5 Communications available for 
decision makers 
NBDM, Ministry of 
Communication and 
Informatics 
5.  1,2,3,4,5 Communications available to alert 
and inform the public 
NBDM, Ministry of 
Communication and 
Informatics 
6.  1,2,3 Locally produced food and milk 
that may be directly contaminated 
Ministry of Agriculture, 
Ministry of Commerce, NNEA 
7.  1,2,3 Information on agricultural product 
collection and distribution system 
Ministry of Agriculture, 
Ministry of Commerce 
8.  1,2,3 Drinking water supply systems Jasa Tirta., Co 
9.  1,2 Population distribution Statistics Indonesia 
10.  1,2 Special populations (e.g., hospitals) 
and transients within UPZ 
Statistics Indonesia 
11.  1,2 Special facilities (e.g., factories that 
cannot be evacuated) that may be 
affected by the emergency 
Ministry of Industry, the 
government 
12.  1,2 Transportation systems that may be 
affected by an emergency (e.g., 
road, rail, air, sea, canals) 
Ministry of Transportation 
13.  1,2,3 Points of import and export of food Ministry of Commerce 
14.  1,2,3,4,5 Range of weather conditions under 
which protective actions and 
monitoring may be conducted 
National Agency for 
Meteorology, Climatology, and 
Geophysics 
15.  1,2,3,4,5 Severe conditions that may result in 
an emergency 
NNEA, NERA 
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4.4. Task 4: Develop concepts of operations and allocate responsibilities 
The IAEA emphasizes the importance of proper and clear allocation of 
responsibilities in the NR-EPR plan. To assist allocation of the responsibilities, the 
IAEA provides a list of response actions, which need to be taken during an emergency. 
The list of response actions is commonly known as critical tasks. Instead of assigning the 
critical tasks to particular agencies, the IAEA suggests that the agencies indicate which 
tasks apply to them as well as their resources and capabilities to perform the tasks 
(IAEA, 2003). In Indonesia, the NERA as the NCA should bear the responsibility to 
distribute the critical tasks to the relevant agencies and ensure that every task is paired to 
a responsible agency. Overall, completion of the list of critical tasks will enable the 
identification of Indonesia’s national resources, and to identify the future needs for the 
establishment of the necessary assets. 
The critical tasks from the IAEA EPR-Methods cover a broad range of 
responsibilities, including those which should be assigned to a facility. To better align 
with the Indonesian NR-EPR plan, adjustments were made to the IAEA’s suggested 
critical tasks.  These results are presented in Table 6. The agency for each task is 
assigned based on the applicable Indonesian EPR regulation; some of them are proposed 
based on the need for conducting the tasks. The final list of agencies, which will be 
responsible to perform the critical tasks, can be determined once the NCA completes the 
distribution of the initial list.  
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Table 6. List of critical tasks adopted from the IAEA EPR-Methods and the agencies 
which are suggested to perform the tasks. 
Threat 
Category 
Critical Tasks Agencies 
1,2,3,4,5 
Coordination for national radiological planning 
(national coordinating authority) 
NERA 
1,2,3,4,5 
Coordination for national conventional response 
planning 
NBDM 
1,2,3 
Coordination for local off-site planning 
(radiological and conventional) 
LDMA 
1, 2, 3, 4 
Notification of other States and requesting 
international assistance 
NERA 
1,2,3 Making decisions on urgent protective actions 
Team (NERA, 
NBDM, NNEA) 
1,2,3 Implementing urgent protective actions 
The government 
(jurisdiction) 
1,2,3 
National coordination of emergency service 
standards and training 
NERA 
1, 2, 3, 4 Providing emergency service support 
The government 
(jurisdiction) 
1, 2, 3, 4 
Providing response to criminal activities (tactical 
response and investigation) 
POLICE 
1,2,3 
Making decisions on longer term and ingestion 
protective actions 
Team (NERA, 
NBDM, NNEA) 
1,2,3 
Implementing longer term and ingestion 
protective actions 
The government 
(jurisdiction) 
1,2,3,4,5 Coordination with the media NBDM 
1, 2, 3, 4 
Off-site monitoring and laboratory analysis 
capabilities 
NNEA 
 
After assinging appropriate responsibilities to pertinent agencies, the concepts of  
operations for the threat response as a function of threat category can be developed. Prior 
to this process, a general threat description which leads to an emergency situation should 
be described. The description contains the postulated emergency events, and how an 
emergency situation may and may not develop. The concepts of operations describe the 
scenario to implement the response actions based on the threat description. It should also 
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include the appropriate response agencies to be deployed during the events. The IAEA 
suggests that the concept of operations are developed based on two principles: the 
emergency response is operated under the incident command system and a single 
location is used to release the information to the public (IAEA, 2003). The default 
concepts of operations based on these principles are provided in the IAEA EPR-Methods 
and can be adopted into the NR-EPR plan. Also, the Nuclear/Radiological Incident 
Annex of the NRF can be used as additional reference. For this task, the NCA has to 
ensure that all necessary resources and arrangements as described in the concepts of 
operations are available or prepared.  
Once the concepts of operations and allocation of responsibilities are performed, 
Task 5 of the graded approach methodology could be performed. At this point, most of 
the weaknesses in the current EPR system and the need for improvements should have 
already been identified.  
4.5. Task 5: Develop interim capabilities 
Developing interim capabilities is suggested by the IAEA as a mean to increase 
the awareness and preparedness for a radiation emergency while the development of the 
NR-EPR plan is in progress (IAEA, 2003). In this step, the regulatory basis for the NR-
EPR can be completed, the weaknesses in the current EPR system can be addressed, and 
the necessary resources for the NR-EPR can be prepared. Another means for increasing 
the interim capabilities is to  provide appropriate training for the emergency workers. 
This training can be conducted as a joint-operation between the NBDM and NERA.  
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In addition, it is also beneficial to build a communication portal to link all 
emergency response agencies. The communication portal can be in the form of internet-
based media managed by the NCA. With this portal, all progress on the development of 
the EPR system can be updated by the relevant agencies. Internet-based media also 
allows reliable, rapid information sharing. This will also help prevent further delays in 
this process. The concept for multi-agencies communication portal would be a potential 
solution to close the gap of communication between the emergency authorities in 
Indonesia and promote the integration of the EPR system.  
 
4.6. Task 6: Write national NR-EPR plan 
Once the proper information from task 1 to task 5 of the graded methodology is 
available, the process of writing a NR-EPR plan can be performed. The plan must 
include common terminologies used in the EPR, threat assessment and ideal response to 
the threat (the concept of operation based on the existing threat categorization), 
description of the roles and responsibilities of every agency involved in the response, 
incident command system (ICS) structure and components, coordination between the 
response agencies, procedures, training and exercises. An outline of the NR-EPR plan, 
based on the IAEA EPR-Methods, is presented in the appendix. For an integrated 
emergency plan, LDMA, facilities, and response agencies must each draft their own 
individual plan based on the national EPR plan.   
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1. Conclusions 
In preparing the future plans for nuclear power, and to anticipate potential 
radiation emergencies from the current practices, Indonesia has to establish a national 
NR-EPR plan. This plan will be the basis to conduct radiation response activities and 
will become the core of a national radiation response framework. The establishment of 
the plan cannot be conducted merely based on the NR-EPR concept, but must be fully 
integrated with conventional emergency management.  
 Although the arrangements for the EPR framework have been promoted in 
current regulations, the development of a national NR-EPR plan has been hindered. The 
main issue that has caused the delay is related to poor inter-agency coordination. The 
NBDM and NERA as the two main agencies responsible for establishing and 
coordinating the NR-EPR plan have not been able to execute their functions in 
emergency management. To resolve the coordination problem, it is suggested that the 
two agencies establish a legally binding agreement as the platform for coordination. The 
agreement must contain a detailed description of each agency’s responsibilities.  
 In addition to the coordination issue, there are also challenges in developing the 
integrated EPR system. First, developing the integrated EPR system requires human and 
financial resources and these have not been included in NBDM program. The current 
NBDM program is focused on the natural disasters. Second, Indonesia does not have a 
general emergency framework, consequently the NR-EPR plan must be detailed and 
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comprehensive. To address the first challenge, the NBDM has to include the radiation 
hazards from practices and facilities in the DM plan, including its proposal to develop 
the integrated EPR system. The second challenge for creating a comprehensive NR-EPR 
plan could be addressed by implementing the IAEA’s integrated planning concept. 
The IAEA’s integrated planning concept is developed by using a graded approach 
methodology. The methodology consists of ten tasks, which need to be implemented 
gradually. The research presented in this thesis applied portions of the graded 
methodology to assess current Indonesian capabilities for radiation emergency and 
prescribed improvements.  The ultimate purpose of this methodology is to create an 
integrated emergency response system, where the preparedness for radiation emergency 
response is built around the national all-hazards plan and complemented by the relevant 
plans at the facility and local levels. This graded methodology allows for a thorough 
evaluation, and ultimately strengthening of national response capabilities, correcting the 
defects in the current system, and building an integrated EPR plan. 
 
5.2. Future Work 
The results of this research could be used as the basis for developing the NR-EPR 
plan and reform the overall EPR system. A more comprehensive threat assessment will 
need to be done to develop the planning basis and concept of radiation response 
operations. The overall future work will need to involve the coordination between the 
relevant emergency response agencies. The national NR-EPR plan could be established 
when the integrated planning concepts are fully adopted and implemented. 
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APPENDIX 
 
The IAEA suggested the following outline for NR-EPR plan. More detail information 
about developing the outline can be found in the IAEA EPR-Methods 2003. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Purpose 
1.2 Participating Organization 
1.3 Scope 
1.4 Legal Basis 
1.5 Related Plans and Documents 
 
II. PLANNING BASIS 
2.1 Types of threat 
2.2 Terms 
2.3 Response roles and responsibilities 
2.4 Response organization 
2.5 Response facilities 
2.6 Response communications 
2.7 Logistic/resources commitments 
2.8 Concepts of operations 
 
III. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCESS 
3.1 Notification, activation and request for assistance 
3.2 Emergency management 
3.3 Performing mitigation 
3.4 Taking urgent protective action 
3.5 Providing warnings and instructions to the public 
3.6 Protecting emergency workers 
3.7 Provide medical assistance and mitigating the non-radiological consequences 
3.8 Assessing the initial phases 
3.9 Keeping the public informed (media relation) 
3.10 Taking agriculture, ingestion and longer-term countermeasures 
3.11 Conducting recovery operations 
3.12 Financing operation 
3.13 Maintaining records and management of data 
 
IV. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROCESS 
4.1 Authorities and responsibilities 
4.2 Organization 
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4.3 Coordination 
4.4 Plans and procedures 
4.5 Logistical support and facilities 
4.6 Training 
4.7 Exercises 
4.8 Quality assurance and program maintenance 
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